Conclusion

Introduction
The issue of Aboriginal self-government has moved from the periphery of constitutional debate to centre stage over the past twelve years. Prior to the patriation of the Canadian Constitution
The next year, the House of Commons Special Committee on Indian Self-Government released its influential Penner Report, recommending that "the right of Indian peoples to self-government be explicitly stated and entrenched in the Constitution of After the demise of the Meech Lake Accord, it was clear that constitutional renewal in Canada could not succeed without the participation of the Aboriginal peoples. The presence of the leaders of the four national Aboriginal organizations 6 at the negotiating table with the first ministers was therefore essential during the next round of talks. As everyone knows, those talks resulted in the Consensus Report on the Constitution, agreed to at Charlottetown on August 28, 1992, by the leaders of the four Aboriginal organizations, the first ministers, and the two territorial leaders. The Charlottetown Accord would have led to recognition in the Constitution of the Aboriginal peoples' inherent right of self-government within Canada, with arrangements for implementation to be settled through further negotiations!
The defeat of the Charlottetown Accord in the Referendum of October 26, 1992, seriously jeopardized the efforts to have Aboriginal self-government explicitly recognized in the Constitution. Although many people have said that the 'No' vote should not be interpreted as a rejection of self-government, political reality in the wake of the Referendum makes it unlikely that express constitutional recognition of that right will be 6. These organizations were: the Assembly of First Nations, representing most status Indians; the Native Council of Canada, representing mainly non-status Indians and some Metis; the M6tis National Council, representing the Metis Nation in the prairie provinces; and the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, representing the Inuit. Note, however, that some Aboriginal people claim not to be represented by any of these organizations. During the latest round of constitutional talks, for example, the Native Women's Association of Canada made this claim with respect to some issues affecting Aboriginal women. See: Sean Fine, "Native women aim to block national referendum in court" The achieved in the near future.' Other options exist, however. One is to pursue self-government outside the constitutional context, an approach which appears to be on the Aboriginal leaders' agendas. 9 This approach could involve negotiated agreements with the federal, and some provincial, governments." Agreements of this sort, however, often involve delegated rather than inherent authority, making them unacceptable to many Aboriginal people." Moreover, unless included in land claims settlements, self-government agreements may not be constitutionally protected."
Another option which Aboriginal leaders are considering is to unilaterally assert jurisdiction." This approach is consistent with self-government as an inherent right, but is certain to be challenged in court. When that happens, Aboriginal governments could either refuse to recognize the jurisdiction of Canadian courts, 14 or claim that self-government is an Aboriginal and treaty right which is already entrenched in s. 35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 15 The issue of whether s. 35(1) recognizes and affirms a right of self-government has not been directly addressed by Canadian courts.' 6 However, judicial decisions have given the section some content, particularly by applying it to Aboriginal and treaty rights 13 . See Geoffrey York, "Natives to move ahead with own laws" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (20 November 1992) A5.
14. This could have serious consequences. During the stand-off at Oka/Kanesatake in 1990, the Canadian government clearly demonstrated that it was willing to use military force to impose jurisdiction on Aboriginal people who denied the authority of the Canadian state. to hunt and fish. 17 The leading case is the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Sparrow, 18 in which a member of the Musqueam Nation in British Columbia was charged for fishing with a drift net which exceeded the length allowed by the Musqueams' food fishing licence, issued pursuant to the federal Fisheries Act. 9 The appellant contended that the licence's restrictions on net length were inconsistent with his Aboriginal right to fish, and were therefore invalid due to s. 35(1). In the unanimous opinion of the Court, delivered by Dickson C.J.C. and La Forest J., s. 35(1) provides constitutional protection to Aboriginal rights which were not extinguished prior to April 17, 1982, when the Constitution Act, 1982 was proclaimed in force.
2 " Prior to that, case law had established that these rights were generally subject to infringement and extinguishment by the Parliament of Canada.
2 ' According to the Sparrow decision, Centre, 1982) , and of the Royal Proclamation and other constitutional instruments in Clark, supra note 15.
22. As the Court did not expressly state that these rights could still be extinguished by federal legislation as well, this issue has been left in doubt. On the one hand, the clear distinction which the Court drew between regulation and extinguishment would seem to preclude the use of the regulatory power to effect an extinguishment: Sparrow, supra note 12 at 1097-1099. On the other, the Court said, at 1109, that "federal power must be reconciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to demand the justification of any government regulation that infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights [my emphasis]." Also, at 1119, the Court seems to have envisaged the possibility of expropriation of an Aboriginal right, which would raise the matter of compensation. If expropriation is equivalent to extinguishment, this may mean that a limited parliamentary power of extinguishment has survived the enactment of s. McGill L.J. 308 at 362-380. Although Sparrow did not involve provincial legislation, the Court did say that s. 35(1) "affords aboriginal peoples constitutional protection against provincial legislative power": supra note 12 at 1105. However, as the extent of that protection was not specified, uncertainty remains over whether the protection is absolute or subject to the same justificatory test as federal legislation. See: Slattery, "First Nations and the Constitution", supra note 2 at 284-285, where it is argued convincingly that the test is not available to justify provincial legislation; Hogg, supra note 2 at 693, where the same conclusion is The Supreme Court's test for justification is as follows. Once it has been shown that Parliament has infringed an existing Aboriginal right, the party relying on the infringement has to prove two things. First, a valid legislative objective for the infringing legislation must be shown. Examples of valid objectives would include preserving Aboriginal rights by conserving and managing a resource, and protecting the public or Aboriginal peoples from the harmful exercise of those rights. However, a claim that the regulations were "in the public interest" would be too vague to qualify. If this initial burden is met, the second step in justifying an infringement involves proving that the legislation is as consistent as possible, in the circumstances, with constitutional recognition and affirmation of the right. The Supreme Court referred to a number of considerations which are relevant in deciding whether the legislation meets the required standard. To start with, "[t]he special trust relationship and the responsibility of the government vis-a-vis aboriginals must be the first consideration in determining whether the legislation or action in question can be justified." 24 Other relevant questions include "whether there has been as little infringement as possible in order to effect the desired result; whether, in a situation of expropriation, fair compensation is available; and, whether the aboriginal group in question has been consulted with respect to the [particular] measures being implemented." 25 The objective of the analysis is to guarantee that the legislation "treat[s] aboriginal peoples in a way ensuring that their rights are taken seriously."
26 Broadly speaking, "recognition and affirmation requires sensitivity to and respect for the rights of aboriginal peoples on behalf of the government, courts and indeed all Canadians." 27 In the context of Sparrow, recognition and affirmation of the Aboriginal right to fish for food and ceremonial purposes meant that federal regulations with the valid legislative objective of conservation had to give Aboriginal fishing for those purposes priority over sport and commercial fishing. 33. Sparrow, supra note 12 at 1109. This is a puzzling statement, for while it is true that s. 35(1) does not itself provide for judicial review of legislation restricting Aboriginal rights, s. 52(1) does impose such an obligation on the courts by providirig: "The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and iny law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect." In the passage from Sparrow accompanying supra note 29, the Court appeared to accept this application of s. 52(1).
Yet, we find that the words "recognition and affirmation" incorporate the fiduciary relationship referred to earlier and so import some restraint on the exercise of sovereign power. Rights that are recognized and affirmed are not absolute. Federal legislative powers continue, including, of course, the right to legislate with respect to Indians pursuant to s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. These powers must, however, now be read together with s. 35(1). In other words, federal power must be reconciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to demand the justification of any government regulation that infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights. 34 This passage suggests that the words "recognized and affirmed" are insufficient to place Aboriginal rights completely beyond the reach of federal legislative power. What those words apparently do is prevent Parliament from breaching the fiduciary obligation which the Crown owes to the Aboriginal peoples. In another passage, the Court described the effect of s. 35(1) in these terms:
The way in which a legislative objective is to be attained must uphold the honour of the Crown and must be in keeping with the unique contemporary relationship, grounded in history and policy, between the Crown and Canada's aboriginal peoples. The extent of legislative or regulatory impact on an existing aboriginal right may be scrutinized so as to ensure recognition and affirmation."
The Supreme Court offered little justification for interpreting the words "recognized and affirmed" as providing Aboriginal rights with only some protection, but not an absolute guarantee, against federal legislative infringement. Their interpretation should be compared with that of Professor Brian Slattery, who undertook an extensive examination of the meaning of the words "recognized and affirmed" before concluding:
When section 35 states that existing aboriginal and treaty rights are "hereby recognized and affirmed," it seems to mean that they are formally acknowledged as valid in law and rendered sure and unavoidable. By "unavoidable" Slattery apparently meant that legislation which attempted either to nullify or restrict an Aboriginal right would be inconsistent with the recognition and affirmation of that right in the Constitution, and to that extent would be of no force or effect due to s. 52(1)." However, in his later work Slattery suggested that s. 35 rights could be overridden in exceptional circumstances by federal legislation, but "only in emergencies, for pressing public need." 38 Finally, in "Understanding Aboriginal Rights," an article which was relied upon extensively by the Supreme Court in Sparrow, Slattery retained the national emergency limitation and added two more qualifications, suggesting that s. 35 rights would also be subject to:
(1) regulations that operate to preserve or advance section 35 rights (as by conserving a natural resource essential to the exercise of such rights); (2) regulations that prevent the exercise of section 35 rights from causing serious harm to the general populace or native peoples themselves (such as standard safety restrictions governing the use of fire-arms in hunting. It does not seem, however, that Slattery's apparent modification of his earlier views was based on a reinterpretation of the meaning of "recognized and affirmed." Instead, as a matter of policy he appears to have become concerned that Aboriginal rights to hunt and fish, for example, would be entirely unregulated if those views were adopted. After suggesting that one approach to s. 35(1) would be to hold that it "recognizes unextinguished aboriginal rights in their original form, so that any regulations restricting their exercise are invalid," he wrote:
provision of this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons." As Slattery pointed out at 383, the "word 'guaranteed' is significant, because it plainly indicates an intent to entrench." In fact, the same word is used in s. 1 to entrench Charter rights.
37. Slattery, "The Constitutional Guarantee," supra note 2 at 254-262. Section 52(1) is reproduced supra note 33.
38. Slattery, "The Hidden Constitution," supra note 2 at 384. The override suggested by Slattery appears to be similar to the federal power under "Peace, Order, and good Government" in s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to impinge on provincial jurisdiction in national emergencies: see Hogg, supra note 2 at 452-462.
39. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights," supra note 2 at 782.
This approach leads to extreme consequences. It suggests, for example, that regulations: implementing basic safety precautions in hunting, or protecting a rare species of animal might be invalid. It seems, moreover, inconsistent with theword "existing," which suggests that the rights in question are affirmed in a contemporary form rather than in their primeval simplicity and vigour.
45
The Supreme Court apparently shared this concern, but unlike -,Slattery gave a restrictive interpretation to the words "recognized arid affirmed" in! order to meet it. 41 As I will explain in more detail later, I thiik the Supreme Court's approach to this matter had little to do with the actual words of s. 35(1), and a great deal to do with policy considerations and the Court's constitutional paradigm, with negative implications for Aboriginal -slfgovernment.
We have seen that the Supreme Court decided that s. 35(1) constitutionalized the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the Aboriginal peoples.
4
" This does not appear to be because this relationship is itself an Aboriginal or treaty right. Rather, in the Court's view the general effect of the section is to elevate this historic relationship to a constitutional level, where it can be used to, protect, the rights that are recognized and affirmed against :.legislation which is unjustifiable because it violates the relationship. But where does this interpretation of s. 35 come from? There is no mention of this fiduciary relationship in s. 35. In fact, despite its historical roots in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the treaty-making process, the relationship was not even a recognized 40 . Ibid. Slattery apparently thought that the presence of the word "existing" supported his policy argument. However, I see no inconsistency between affirming Aboriginal rights in their contemporary form, and exempting them from federal regulatory power, unless one interprets "existing" as preserving the federal regulatory power which existed prior to the enactment of s. 35(1), an interpretation which Slattery clearly rejected, at least in his earlier work. See "The Constitutional Guarantee," supra note 2 at 257-262, and "The Hidden Constitution," supra note 2 at 383.
41. On the effect of the word "existing," the Court relied on Slattery's interpretation, not to imply a limited federal regulatory power, but to reject !the "frozen rights" approach to s. 35(1) which some lower courts had taken: Sparrow, * supra note 12 at 1091-1093. In the Supreme Court's view, "existing" means "unextinguished:" ibid. at 1092.
. 42. For discussion of this aspect of the decision, see Turpel, supra note 28.
legal concept in 1982." 3 It first appeared on the scene as a major element in Aboriginal rights jurisprudence in 1984 when the Supreme Court decided Guerin v. Canada." But while seven out of eight judges in that case found that the Crown has a fiduciary obligation to the Aboriginal peoples, Dickson J. and three others appear to have regarded the obligation as arising in a legal sense only upon a surrender of Indian lands to the Crown. 45 The idea that the Crown has a broad fiduciary obligation to the Aboriginal peoples in all its dealings with them was first expressed by the Supreme Court in the Sparrow decision. 45. Guerin, supra note 43 at 375-387. Wilson J. and two others thought the obligation existed before surrender, but they nonetheless related it directly to Indian lands: ibid. at 348-350.
46. Supra note 12 at 1108: "In our opinion, Guerin, together with R. v. Taylor and Williams (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 360, ground a general guiding principle for s. 35(1). That is, the Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship." Note that the aspect of Taylor and Williams relied on by the Supreme Court in Sparrow was that, in interpreting Indian treaties, courts must keep in mind that "the honour of the Crown is always involved and no appearance of 'sharp dealing' should be sanctioned": 34 O.R. (2d) 360 at 367.
Admittedly, what matters in the context of statutory interpretation is not the actual intention of the legislators, but the legislative objective or purpose behind the statute. 47 In Sparrow, the Supreme Court took a purposive approach to s. 35, acknowledging that it "represents the culmination of a long and difficult struggle in both the political forum and the courts for the constitutional recognition of aboriginal rights." 48 The approach to be taken in interpreting it, the Court said, "is derived from general principles of constitutional interpretation, principles relating to aboriginal rights, and the purposes behind the constitutional provision itself." 49 Moreover, "[w]hen the purposes of the affirmation of aboriginal rights are considered, it is clear that a generous, liberal interpretation of the words in the constitutional provision is demanded."" However, an examination of the Court's discussion of actual legislative purpose reveals little beyond a general desire to protect rights, which in the past "were often honoured in the breach," from legislative infringement. 5 1 The Court did not suggest there was evidence of an intention to entrench a fiduciary relationship.
The question which remains unanswered is this: Given the legislative purpose to constitutionalize Aboriginal rights, and the desire to give s. 35(1) "a generous, liberal interpretation," 52 why did the Supreme Court decide that those rights are still subject to justifiable federal legislation? Why do "[f]ederal legislative powers continue, including, of course, the right to legislate with respect to Indians pursuant to s. 91 (24) 
Sparrow:
The constitutional recognition afforded by the provision therefore gives a measure of control over government conduct and a strong check on legislative power. While it does not promise immunity from government regulation in a society that, in the twentieth century, is increasingly more complex, interdependent and sophisticated, and where exhaustible resources need protection and management, it does hold the Crown to a substantive promise. The government is required to bear the burden of justifying any legislation that has some negative effect on any aboriginal right protected under s. 
K. McNeil
The constitutional recognition of the right to fish cannot entail restoring the relationship between Indians and salmon as it existed 150 years ago. The world has changed. The right must now exist in the context of a parliamentary system of government and a federal division of powers. It cannot be defined as if the Musqueam band had continued to be a self-governing entity, or as if its members were not citizens of Canada and residents of British Columbia. Any definition of the existing right must take into account that it exists in the context of an industrial society with all of its complexities and competing interests. The "existing right" in 1982 was one which had long been subject to regulation by the federal government. It must continue to be so because only government can regulate with due regard to the interests of all [my emphasis]. 5 6 In the view of the Court of Appeal, the constitutional right to fish could not be regulated by self-governing Aboriginal peoples. Lack of faith in the capacity of Aboriginal peoples to govern the exercise of their rights is also implicit in the Supreme Court's decision. Counsel for Sparrow argued that, due to s. 35(1), authority to regulate an Aboriginal right inheres in the people holding the right, as "the right to regulate is part of the right to use the resource."
7 Counsel speculated that federal regulations might nonetheless be applicable, but only in exceptional circumstances, may be revealed in the following words, expressed almost immediately after the passage just quoted:
It is worth recalling that while British policy towards the native population was based on respect for their right to occupy their traditional lands, a proposition to which the Royal Proclamation of 1763 bears witness, there was from the outset never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to such lands vested in the Crown.
9
So the standard denial of the inherent right of the Aboriginal peoples to govern themselves, a denial imbedded in Canadian constitutional law,' appears to have been the Supreme Court's starting point for assessing the effect of s. 35(1). It seems that the Court was reluctant to alter the legislative power structure of Canada by interpreting the section as creating a constitutionally protected space for Aboriginal governments. 61 The Court's conclusion that "[f]ederal legislative powers continue ' "62 therefore should have come as no surprise.
In order to understand the judicial mindset which led to this conclusion, I think it is necessary to examine the principles underlying the Canadian Constitution. 
II. Foundations of the Canadian Constitution
The preamble to the Constitution Act, 186765 states that Canada shall have "a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom." The Act does not specify what that means, nor does it contain any other statement of the general principles underlying the Canadian Constitution. Indeed, it is a rather technical document, providing Canada with a federal system of government with legislative powers divided between Parliament and the provincial legislatures, without any of the high-sounding rhetoric commonly found in other constitutions. To find the principles on which the Canadian Constitution is based, one therefore has to go House of Commons, culminating in the seventeenth century with the over-throw of the Stuarts, and the acceptance of the rule that the Crown is subject to Parliament, the supreme law-making author-ity." The power of the Crown, which at one time had been virtually absolute, was gradually diminished to a residual prerogative, exercisable most prominently in the area of foreign affairs. 68 With the triumph of Parliament, the idea that there are no legal restrictions on its legislative power came to dominate British constitutional thought. 69 Earlier judicial dicta that Parliament could not legislate contrary to common right and reason' were no longer regarded as good law. 7 At a more theoretical level, this change in thinking was reflected in a jurisprudential shift away from natural law concepts of fundamental rights to legal positivism.
72 By the mid-nineteenth century, the view that law is the command of the sovereign was prevalent.
73 Since Parliament 72. As de Smith and Brazier wrote, Blackstone's "lip-service to the primacy of natural law" in 1765 was but a faint echo of earlier views which "had long since ceased to have legal significance; for the judges had tacitly accepted a rule of obligation to give effect to every Act of Parliament, no matter how preposterous its content:" de Smith and Brazier, supra note 66 at 72. 73. John Austin was, of course, the leading proponent of this view, but Jeremy Bentham and others had laid the foundations for positivist theory before him.
was regarded as supreme, with authority to make or unmake any law, the concepts of legal positivism and parliamentary sovereignty were mutually reinforcing. It is therefore no coincidence that Dicey's classic exposition of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was written in the late nineteenth century when legal positivism dominated British jurisprudential thought. 77 The federal system itself imposed an additional limitation on parliamentary sovereignty by restricting the competence of the provincial legislatures to certain subject matters, and by excluding matters within exclusive provincial jurisdiction from federal competence. 8 Some scholars see further restrictions on the applicability of the doctrine arising from the fact that, unlike Britain, Canada has an. entrenched, written Constitution." These restrictions are even more extensive toddy, given the limitations that the Charter ofRights and Freedoms places on both federal and provincial legislative competence." law. 8 Within their respective areas of jurisdiction, the Canadian Parliament and the provincial legislatures have been said to be supreme, with the same authority as the British Parliament. 82 Moreover, all legislative and executive powers exercisable in Canada have been thought to be distributed between the federal and provincial governments. 3 In the words of Earl Loreburn, "whatever belongs to self-government in Canada belongs either to the Dominion or to the provinces, within the limits of the British North America Act." 84 By implication, the Constitution left no residual powers of self-government to the Aboriginal peoples. 8 " As a result, any governmental authority actually exercised by them has been due either to sufferance, or to delegation under the federal Indian Act 86 or other legislation. The enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982 provided an opportunity to end the colonialism inherent in the view that legislative powers were exhaustively distributed in 1867 between the federal and provincial governments. The Charter, and the express provision in s. 52(1) that the "Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada," made a reassessment of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty imperative, as certain matters were clearly placed beyond the competence of either order of government. 88 Where the Aboriginal peoples are concerned, s. the rule is "clearly implicit in the very nature of a Constitution,"
even if not specifically set out.
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The rule of law has two main aspects." 3 First, it entails that, to ,-govern, the relationships and dealings of people in society, a generally accepted and enforceable body of law exist. This body of law provides stability and order, and guides the members of the society in their interactions with one another. Second, the rule of law requires that everyone, including government officials, be subject to the accepted body of law, and act in accordance with it.
In other words, no one is above the law. This protects the members of the society from arbitrary acts by persons in authority, ensuring that they do not interfer with rights and freedoms without legal justification." It is the first aspect of the rule of law that is particularly The Court's solution to this problem was to invoke the rule of law as a fundamental constitutional principle to maintain the application of the invalid statutes until they could be translated into French, and re-enacted in both official languages. In this way, the Court was able "to recognize the unconstitutionality of Manitoba's unilingual laws and the Legislature's duty to comply with the 'supreme law' of this country, while avoiding a legal vacuum in supplement textual analysis with historical, contextual and purposive interpretation in order to ascertain the intent of the makers of our Constitution. 3 In the Court's view, "[t]he founders of this nation must have intended, as one of the basic principles of nation building, that Canada be a society of legal order and normative structure: one governed by rule of law."'O The Court would not permit this principle to be violated by allowing strict application of the Constitution to create chaos and disorder.' More specifically,
[t]he Constitution will not suffer a province without laws. Thus the Constitution requires that temporary validity and force and effect be given to the current Acts of the Manitoba Legislature .... It is only in this way that legal chaos can be avoided and the rule of law preserved.' 6 Avoiding legal chaos through the application of the rule of law is therefore a paramount constitutional value which takes precedence over the written terms of the Constitution. governing Aboriginal and treaty rights throughout Canada, this inter-pretation would have created a partial legal vacuum, which was the very thing the Court took such pains to avoid in Manitoba. In the context of Sparrow, the legal vacuum would have encompassed Aboriginal fishing for food and ceremonial purposes, which would have been completely unregulated in the absence of Aboriginal laws governing this activity. The Supreme Court found this possibility unacceptable, as it could lead to depletion of the very resource which makes the Aboriginal right to fish meaningful. So, in the Court's view, federal legislative authority over Aboriginal fishing had to continue in the interest of conservation, subject to the justificatory test we have already discussed.
But Aboriginal and treaty rights cover much more than fishing for food and ceremonial purposes. In many cases, they probably include fishing for commercial purposes as well."° They generally include hunting and trapping, which can also be commercial. " ' Aboriginal rights encompass the use of other natural products of lands and waters covered by Aboriginal title, as well as an interest in the land itself. 1 ' They may also include any other uses to which Aboriginal lands can be put, such as agriculture and commercial development."' Aboriginal and treaty rights probably both extend to the maintenance of Aboriginal customs and traditions, including the use of Aboriginal languages,"' and the practice of Aboriginal spirituality."' In short, Aboriginal and treaty rights arguably cover all aspects of Aboriginal life. To the extent that those rights were not extinguished prior to the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, they are recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1).
The Supreme Court is obviously aware of the uncertain and potentially open-ended nature of Aboriginal and treaty rights.' In deciding Sparrow, it knew that the general interpretation it placed on s. 35(1) would apply not only to the Aboriginal right of the Musqueam Nation to fish for food and ceremonial purposes, but to every Aboriginal and treaty right of all the Aboriginal peoples across Canada. If the Court had decided that those rights are beyond the regulatory power of both the federal and provincial legislatures, that could have created a legal vacuum which might have been even more damaging to public order and the stability of Canadian society, from the perspective of the judges, than a declaration that almost all the provincial statutes in Manitoba were void. The rule of law, as the Court understood and articulated that concept in the Manitoba Language Rights decision, would have been violated. As in the case of Manitoba, the Court was therefore willing to bend the actual terms of the Constitution to avoid that result. Where the unilingual Manitoba statutes were concerned, it did this by maintaining their force until they could be translated and re-enacted in both official languages. Where Aboriginal and treaty rights were concerned, it accomplished the same thing by maintaining federal jurisdiction over them, subject to the justificatory test which the Court created." anthropological evidence that all societies have rules governing interactions among their members. 117 Of course those rules vary from one society to another, and do not necessarily cover the same aspects of human behavior. Moreover, the mechanisms for enforcement of the rules can be very different."
8 However, these are not reasons for denying these rules the status of laws. The assumption that Aboriginal societies do not have laws governing activities such as fishing should not be made without a factual basis. Furthermore, one should not expect Aboriginal laws necessarily to be enacted by legislative bodies, or to be written down. Those expectations would be ethnocentric and inappropriate, as they would involve imposing Euro-Canadian standards on Aboriginal societies.
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The Supreme Court may not have assumed in Sparrow that the Musqueam Nation had no laws of its own governing fishing by its members. But it did seem to think that any laws the Musqueam may have had would be inadequate to regulate their fishing in the interest of conservation because, as we have seen, the Court said that s. 35(1) did not provide them with "immunity from government regulation in a society that, in the twentieth century, is increasingly more complex, interdependent and sophisticated, and where exhaustible resources need protection and management."12 The word "government" in this passage obviously means the kind of government the judges are accustomed to, in this context the federal government. The Court did not envisage that Aboriginal governments would be capable of ensuring that finite resources are 117. See Michael Asch, "Errors in Delgamuukw: An Anthropolgical Perspective" in Cassidy, ed., supra note 112 at 221-43, especially 224-225. not depleted by Aboriginal use. The colonial vision of the Canadian Constitution, based on parliamentary sovereignty and exhaustive distribution of powers between the federal and provincial governments, was still influencing the judges. Moreover, it is apparent that they feared that, if they interpreted s. 35(1) as absolutely protecting Aboriginal and treaty rights, this would create a legal vacuum, which would violate the rule of law as the Court understood it. Just as "government" does not include Aboriginal government, "law" does not include Aboriginal law. I think that this judicial mindset is behind the Court's conclusion that Aboriginal rights can still be infringed by federal legislation, as nothing in the actual words of s. 35(1) leads to this result.
Support for my appraisal of the Court's approach to s. 35(1) in Sparrow can be found by comparing it with the way the Court assessed another constitutional provision guaranteeing Aboriginal and treaty rights, namely a provision in the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements. 121 These agreements transferred most public lands and resources in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta to the Crown in right of those provinces in 1930, placing them in a position equal to that of the other Canadian provinces, which had retained their lands and resources when they entered Confederation."' In order to provide limited protection to Aboriginal and treaty rights to hunt, trap, and fish for food, the following provision, which I refer to as the game laws paragraph, was included in the agreements:
In order to secure to the Indians of the Province the continuance of the supply of game and fish for their support and subsistence, Canada agrees that the laws respecting game in force in the Province from time to time shall apply to the Indians within the boundaries thereof, provided, however, that the said Indians shall have the right, which the Province hereby assures to them, of hunting, trapping and fishing game and fish for food at all seasons of the year on all 121. These agreements were implemented by federal and provincial legislation in the three prairie provinces, as well as by Imperial legislation. The Imperial legislation, the British North America Act, 1930 Sparrow decision, this may appear surprising. However, I think the explanation for this apparent discrepancy lies in the fact that the courts have found other means to avoid whatever negative impact the game laws paragraph might have on conservation. First, courts have decided that Crown lands which have been set aside by a province bona fide as game preserves are occupied, and therefore are not available for Indian hunting, trapping, or fishing, unless there is a right of accesss for those purposes."' However, game preserves might not be adequate for conservation in some instances, particularly if a species, such as the whooping crane, is in danger of extinction. Without explicitly addressing this issue, the Supreme Court has nonetheless dealt with it by deciding that the game laws paragraph does not protect Indian hunting, trapping, and fishing against federal legislation. 128 As Parliament probably has broad jurisdiction to regulate these Aboriginal activities under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867,129 this means that federal legislation can always be enacted if necessary for conservation. 13 In other words, the Court interpreted the game laws paragraph in a way that maintained parliamentary sovernot provide constitutional protection for commercial hunting. However, Cory J. based that conclusion on his interpretation of the words "for food" in the paragraph. In no case has the Court said that conservation needs would override the protection which the paragraph provides for Indian subsistence hunting.
127 eignty, and its own vision of the rule of law, over AboriginalRegarding a point made by the respondent about conservation, Laskin C.J. observed that the appellants' counsel "conceded that the prohibitory order, if made for conservation purposes, would govern any Indian fishing rights."' 43 He said he was inclined to the view that the prohibition served a conservation purpose, from which he concluded: "Hence, even if the fishing rights claimed were established, they would have been properly subordinated to conservation of the fisheries in the particular rivers." ' 
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Dickson J., in a separate judgment concurring in the result, disagreed with the majority view that article 13 did not place any restrictions on Canada's authority to regulate the Indian fishery. In his view, "[t]he reference to 'policy' in art. 13 establishes a limitation upon the federal legislative power in relation to the Indian fishery and sets up a standard against which that federal legislation is to be tested."' 45 However, Dickson J. said the words "a policy as liberal" allow for flexibility, and require the Court to balance the pre-Confederation policy with the current measures. In assessing the liberality of the post-Confederation policy, it is necessary to take into account both the emergence of conservation as a limitation by reason of declining fish stocks and the development of a commercial and sports fishery after 1871. 146 Dickson J. would have given Indian food fishing, and to a lesser extent Indian commercial fishing, priority over non-Indian commercial and sports fishing. However, for him conservation came first:
[A]ny limitation upon Indian fishing that is established for a valid conservation purpose overrides the protection afforded the Indian fishery by art. 13, just as such conservation measures override other taking of fish. 4 On the facts, he found that the closure of certain rivers to salmon fishing "was reasonable and necessary for the purpose of conservation and [did] not offend against the priority assured to the Indian fishery by reason of art. 13 of the Terms of Union." ' 148 Chief Justice Laskin and Dickson J. therefore agreed that, if article 13 placed constitutional restrictions on federal legislative powers relating to Indian fishing, federal regulations for valid conservation purposes would nonetheless override the protection which article 13 provided. As in Sparrow, the Supreme Court was therefore unwilling to allow a constitutional provision to impinge on parliamentary sovereignty where the valid legislative objective of conservation was concerned.
Our brief examination of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements and s. 88 of the Indian Act revealed that the Supreme Court did not take conservation into account when constitutional restrictions on provincial legislative powers over Aboriginal hunting and fishing were involved. However, when constitutional restrictions on federal legislative powers were suggested in the context of the British Columbia Terms of Union, the Court was willing to use conservation to limit the scope of the alleged restrictions. In my view, the reason courts treat these situations differently is that, if necessary for conservation, the federal government could enact legislation to regulate Aboriginal hunting and fishing which the provinces were unable to regulate, 49 but conversely the provinces could not conversely legislate to replace federal laws that were found unconstitutional in the same context. 1 50 In each of these situations, the Supreme Court has maintained its own vision of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law by preserving federal legislative power. Subject to the justificatory test, it did the same thing in Sparrow, despite the fact 148. Jack, supra note 138 at 315. There may nonetheless be a way to use that decision for the promotion of self-government. The key is to meet the Court's unarticulated, but evident, concern that a jurisdictional and legal vacuum would result if federal authority over Aboriginal and treaty rights was excluded by s. 35(1).
To do this, one first needs to redefine the British conceptions of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law in ways that are appropriate for Canada. Canadian definitions of these concepts must take into account not only our federal system and the Charter ofRights and Freedoms, but also the presence of Aboriginal peoples with governments and laws which have as much claim to legitimacy as the federal and provincial governments and laws. In Canada, parliamentary sovereignty therefore has to be redefined so that legislative jurisdiction is divided among the federal, provincial, and Aboriginal governments. The rule of law must also be redefined to include Aboriginal laws, as well as the common law and federal and provincial legislation. To cling to the old notions of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law is to perpetuate outdated and unacceptable colonial attitudes.
For these new definitions to be meaningful, s. 35(1) has to be interpreted as creating a constitutional space for Aboriginal governments and laws. The jurisdiction these governments can exercise within that space would extend to all components of the Aboriginal and treaty rights that the section recognizes and affirms, which, as we have seen, probably include all aspects of Aboriginal life. What the Aboriginal peoples have to do if they want to exercise their jurisdiction is to fill this constitutional space with Aboriginal laws. To the extent that these laws, whether customary or legislative in nature, are already in place, the task is simply to act on them and demonstrate their existence. Where they are not in place, Aboriginal peoples have the option of making them by exercising their inherent right of selfgovernment. ' Failing that, however, federal laws infringing their Aboriginal and treaty rights which meet the justificatory test will continue to apply to them due to the decision in Sparrow.
To the extent that Aboriginal and treaty rights are adequately regulated by Aboriginal laws, federal laws infringing those rights 152. Because this right is inherent, stemming from the fact that Aboriginal peoples were self-governing nations prior to the colonization of Canada by Europeans, it does not have to be recognized by the Canadian Constitution. All that is necessary for it to flourish and grow is to provide a constitutional space where that can happen, which, on the argument presented here, is what s. 35(1) has done. cannot apply to them. 53 This conclusion flows from the Sparrow decision. As we have seen, before federal laws are allowed to infringe Aboriginal and treaty rights, the Supreme Court said a valid legislative objective must exist. Moreover, that objective has to be pursued in a manner which infringes those rights as little as possible. But if an Aboriginal people is already regulating its own rights in a way which is consistent with the legislative objective, there can be no need, and therefore no justification, for the federal laws to apply. ' In the context of the fishing rights which were in question in Sparrow, for example, if the Musqueam had shown that they had laws which adequately regulated the fishing activities of the members of their Nation, there would be no reason for the federal fishery regulations to apply to them."' 5 In those circumstances, an attempt by the federal government to try to justify the. application of its own regulations would probably fail. The government might nonetheless attempt to show that, however adequately the Musqueam were regulating their fishing, management of the resource as a whole required a comprehensive regulatory scheme, with priority given to Aboriginal users. But even if that were so, it would not necessarily mean that the Sparrow test of justification had been met so that the federal regulations would displace those of the Musqueam Nation. The Sparrow test, it should be recalled, can require consultation with Aboriginal people before regulatory measures are applied to them.' 56 It is therefore suggested that, in this situation, the federal government would be under an obligation to discuss its 153. A fortiori, provincial laws would not apply either, even if the Sparrow test can be used to justify them in the absence of Aboriginal laws: see supra note 23.
154. For a variation on this approach, see Slattery "First Nations and the Constitution", supra note 2, especially at 282-283.
155. The burden of proving Aboriginal laws appears to be on the people alleging them, as common law courts do not initially take judicial notice of them. On conservation plans with the Musqueam Nation, and try to arrive at a negotiated solution. This cooperative approach could result in a treaty, which each party would agree to implement. In this way, the right of the Musqueam Nation to govern fishing by its members would be respected, and at the same time the federal government's objective of comprehensively regulating the fishery would be met."'
Conclusion
Decolonization of the Canadian Constitution involves envisaging space for Aboriginal governments to exercise their inherent powers, which can be done by interpreting s. 35(1) in an expansive way. While avoiding the jurisdictional vacuum which the Supreme Court apparently feared in Sparrow, this approach is consistent with the justificatory test which the Court laid down in that case. Moreover, it empowers the Aboriginal peoples to take charge of their own communities at whatever pace they choose. Selfgovernment is neither withheld from nor forced upon them. Some Aboriginal peoples might choose to exercise extensive selfgovernment powers immediately, while others might choose to wait until they feel better prepared. The process could be a stepby-step one, permitting an Aboriginal people to gain confidence and expertise in one area, before gradually extending its jurisdiction into other fields. This would allow for both stability and growth. But most importantly of all, it would provide a way to acknowledge immediately, without more constitutional haggling, that Aboriginal governments have a rightful place in the Canadian Constitution.
157. If a negotiated agreement could not be reached, the validity of the federal regulations could be tested in court in accordance with the Sparrow test. In that event, the good faith of each of the parties in the negotiations would be an important factor to consider. It would therefore be in the interest of both parties to negotiate sincerely.
